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1COMPUTATIONAL POWER AND THE SOCIAL 
IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Tim Hwang1
Machine learning is a computational process. To that end, it is inextricably 
tied to computational power - the tangible material of chips and 
semiconductors that the algorithms of machine intelligence operate on. 
Most obviously, computational power and computing architectures shape 
the speed of training and inference in machine learning, and therefore 
influence the rate of progress in the technology. But, these relationships are 
more nuanced than that: hardware shapes the methods used by researchers 
and engineers in the design and development of machine learning models. 
Characteristics such as the power consumption of chips also define where 
and how machine learning can be used in the real world.
In a broader perspective, computational power is also important because of 
its specific geographies. Semiconductors are designed, fabricated, and 
deployed through a complex international supply chain. Market structure 
and competition among companies in this space influence the progress of 
machine learning. Moreover, since these supply chains are also considered 
significant from a national security perspective, hardware becomes an 
arena in which government industrial and trade policy has a direct impact 
on the fundamental machinery necessary for artificial intelligence (AI). 
This paper aims to dig more deeply into the relationship between 
computational power and the development of machine learning. 
Specifically, it examines how changes in computing architectures, machine 
learning methodologies, and supply chains might influence the future of AI. 
In doing so, it seeks to trace a set of specific relationships between this 
underlying hardware layer and the broader social impacts and risks around 
AI. On one hand, this examination shines a spotlight on how hardware 
works to exacerbate a range of concerns around ubiquitous surveillance, 
technological unemployment, and geopolitical conflict. On the other, it also 
highlights the potentially significant role that shaping the development of 
computing power might play in addressing these concerns.  
* * *
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INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is a computational process. To that end, it is 
inextricably tied to computational power - the tangible material of chips and 
semiconductors that the algorithms of machine intelligence operate on. 
Most obviously, computational power and computing architectures shape 
the speed of training and inference in machine learning, and therefore 
influence the rate of progress in the technology. But, these relationships are 
more nuanced than that: hardware shapes the methods used by researchers 
and engineers in the design and development of machine learning models. 
Characteristics such as the power consumption of chips also define where 
and how machine learning can be used in the real world.
In a broader perspective, computational power is also important 
because of its specific geographies. Semiconductors are designed, 
fabricated, and deployed through a complex international supply chain. 
Market structure and competition among companies in this space influence 
the progress of machine learning. Moreover, since these supply chains are 
also considered significant from a national security perspective, hardware 
3becomes an arena in which government industrial and trade policy has a 
direct impact on the fundamental machinery necessary for artificial 
intelligence (AI). 
Despite this, many analyses of the social impact of the current wave 
of progress in AI have not substantively brought the dimension of hardware 
into their accounts. While a common trope in both the popular press and 
scholarly literature is to highlight the massive increase in computational 
power that has enabled the recent breakthroughs in machine learning, the 
analysis frequently goes no further than this observation around magnitude. 
This paper aims to dig more deeply into the relationship between 
computational power and the development of machine learning. 
Specifically, it examines how changes in computing architectures, machine 
learning methodologies, and supply chains might influence the future of AI. 
In doing so, it seeks to trace a set of specific relationships between this 
underlying hardware layer and the broader social impacts and risks around 
AI. On one hand, this examination shines a spotlight on how hardware 
works to exacerbate a range of concerns around ubiquitous surveillance, 
technological unemployment, and geopolitical conflict. On the other, it also 
highlights the potentially significant role that shaping the development of 
computing power might play in addressing these concerns.  
Part I will examine the role that computational power has played in 
the progress of machine learning, arguing that its impact has been 
somewhat flattened in recent accounts looking at the social impact of the 
technology. Part II will look at trends towards increasing specialization in 
the hardware used for machine learning, and its implications for control and 
privacy in the space. Part III will look at the semiconductor supply chain, 
and its implications for the geopolitics of machine learning. Part IV will 
examine research developments changing the balance between data and 
computational power in the workflow of machine learning, and its influence 
on the economic impact of the technology. It will then conclude with some 
remarks on the potential role of hardware as a lever for policy action in the 
space. 
PART I: MACHINE LEARNING AND COMPUTATIONAL POWER
4AI has historically moved through multiple cycles of progress and 
optimism followed by setbacks and pessimism, so called “AI winters”.2 
Present-day excitement around AI, and more specifically the recent 
breakthroughs in the subfield of machine learning, represent only the latest 
upswing in this historical pattern.
Machine learning itself, the study of algorithms which improve 
themselves through data, is not a new domain of research. The 
fundamentals underlying the modern advances in the field were established 
by researchers in the 1950s and developed throughout the subsequent 
decades.3
However, neural networks - the specific technique of machine 
learning driving much of the commercial interest in AI today - were still 
considered a niche area of research only until relatively recently. As one 
popular account has put it, “for much of its history most computer scientists 
saw it [neural networks] as vaguely disreputable, even mystical.”4 It was 
recognized early in this history that the neural networks proposed during the 
1950s and 1960s were limited by the comparatively minimal processing 
power available at the time.5 The continued growth of computational power, 
along with the accumulation of large datasets during the 1990s and 2000s, 
played a major role in revitalizing progress in neural networks and 
motivating significant investment within the field of AI more broadly.
The field of computer vision, which focuses on advancing the ability 
for machines to extract understanding from images and video, offers one 
representative example on this point. “Traditional” approaches to these 
tasks in the 1990s and early 2000s focused on algorithms which specified a 
set of defined features that would be used to process and classify an image.6 
2 For an account of this history, see generally John Markoff, Machines of Loving Grace: 
The Quest for Common Ground Between Humans and Robots (2015).
3 See, e.g., B. Farley & W. Clark, Simulation of self-organizing systems by digital 
computer, 4 Transactions of the IRE Professional Group on Information Theory 76–84 
(1954).
4 Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, The New York Times, December 14, 
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html (last 
visited Mar 20, 2018).
5 See Marvin Minsky & Seymour A. Papert, Perceptrons: An Introduction to 
Computational Geometry (1969) (noting these limitations).
6 See, e.g., D.G. Lowe, Object recognition from local scale-invariant features, 1150–1157 
vol.2 (1999), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/790410/ (last visited Mar 20, 2018) 
(describing the SIFT algorithm, one representative approach).
5Neural networks, in contrast, learn the relevant features for classification 
rather than having them pre-designed into the algorithm.7
Expanding computational power and the availability of data changed 
the practice of computer vision. On the data front, the growth of the 
consumer web produced a vast library of images for machine learning 
systems to train on. ImageNet, an annotated dataset of 14 million images in 
20 thousand categories assembled by workers on the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk platform, provided a common dataset for researchers to work with.8 
Computational power also continued to increase in the 2000s, rising from 
37 million transistors per chip in 2000 to 2.3 billion transistors per chip by 
2009.9 This was augmented by the finding that a particular kind of 
computational architecture - the GPU - was particularly well-suited as a 
platform for neural networks, a development discussed in more detail in 
Part II.10 
Leveraging both of these assets, neural networks were able to 
significantly surpass the performance of earlier techniques in the space.11 
The ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge is a commonly 
cited marker of this transition. Hosted since 2010, the Challenge brings 
together researchers to compete in designing systems to solve a set of visual 
recognition tasks.12 Performance in 2010 and 2011, which featured teams 
using traditional techniques in the space, were never able to reduce error 
rates below 25%, with most teams showing much higher rates of error.13
7 See, e.g., Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever & Geoffrey E. Hinton, ImageNet classification 
with deep convolutional neural networks, 60 Communications of the ACM 84–90 (2017) 
(demonstrating this learned feature approach).
8 Dave Gershgorn, The data that transformed AI research—and possibly the world Quartz, 
https://qz.com/1034972/the-data-that-changed-the-direction-of-ai-research-and-possibly-
the-world/ (last visited Mar 20, 2018).
9 Moore’s Law: Transistors per microprocessor, Our World in Data, 
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/transistors-per-microprocessor (last visited Mar 20, 
2018).
10 See Rajat Raina, Anand Madhavan & Andrew Y. Ng, Large-scale deep unsupervised 
learning using graphics processors, 1–8 (2009), 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1553374.1553486 (last visited Mar 20, 2018).
11 Cf. From not working to neural networking, The Economist, 2016, 
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21700756-artificial-intelligence-boom-
based-old-idea-modern-twist-not (last visited Mar 20, 2018).
12 ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC), http://www.image-
net.org/challenges/LSVRC/ (last visited Mar 20, 2018).
13 Id.
6AlexNet, a system submitted to the competition by researchers 
Geoffrey Hinton, Ilya Sutskever, and Alex Krizhevsky in 2012, was both 
the first entry to apply neural networks in the Challenge and the first to 
achieve a below 25% error rate.14 The excitement around these results, and 
the margin of improvement over established techniques, led one researcher 
to state that the “Imagenet 2012 event was definitely what triggered the big 
explosion of AI today”.15
Computational power has for this reason been fundamental to the 
present-day breakthroughs in machine learning. Even if the necessary data 
been widely available at an earlier point historically, a lack of 
computational power would have effectively prevented neural networks 
from achieving their current level of performance. 
The Tropes of Computational Power
The narrative of computational power and machine learning typically 
ends here. Recent pieces examining these technological breakthroughs have 
often focused more on the implications of what the technology can do, 
rather than the implications of how it is being done.16 To the extent that 
computational power is mentioned, it is typically addressed simply as an 
enabling factor in the emergence of machine learning. The prevailing 
attribute highlighted in these accounts has tended to be one of magnitude: 
the processing power of the chips running machine learning have been seen 
as their primary contribution. 
The 2016 White House report Preparing for the Future of Artificial 
Intelligence is illustrative. The paper focuses on computational power only 
in passing as one of the three factors enabling the present-day 
breakthroughs in machine learning. “[T]he availability of big 
data…dramatically improved machine learning approaches and 
algorithms…the capabilities of more powerful computers.”17 An 
14 Id.
15 See supra note 8 (for a visualization of these results).
16 See, e.g., JURI Committee, European Civil Law Rules in Robotics (2016), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571379/IPOL_STU(2016)571
379_EN.pdf; Urs Gasser, AI and the Law: Setting the Stage, Medium (2017), 
https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/ai-and-the-law-setting-the-stage-48516fda1b11 
(last visited Mar 20, 2018).
17 White House National Science and Technology Council, Preparing for the Future of 
Artificial Intelligence 6 (2016), available at 
7accompanying paper released at the same time, The National Artificial 
Intelligence Research and Development Plan, highlights improved 
hardware for machine learning as a priority, but only to the extent that chips 
with higher levels of performance are needed to drive the technology 
forwards.18 Other reports from the European Union, civil society groups, 
and researchers on the topic of AI have followed a similar set of themes 
when considering the role of computational power.19
This narrative perhaps leaves out an important part of the story. Such 
a shorthand enables a focus on the numerous problematic ways that 
machine learning might be applied and the implications of those 
applications for justice, equity, and a host of other values. However, it also 
flattens out the role that computational power plays in these issues to simply 
that of a trigger for technological progress. This may miss the significant 
and nuanced ways that hardware influences the impact of AI on these 
broader values and social concerns.
Computational power does more than simply make the present-day 
breakthroughs in machine learning possible. The medium is a significant 
message here: hardware actively shapes the landscape of what can be done 
with the technology of machine learning, and plays a significant role in 
influencing how it will evolve going forwards. 
The contours of computational power play a role in defining who has 
control over and access to the benefits of machine learning, and the actors 
that will play a role in its governance. It plays a role in the politics of the 
technology, both at the level of an individual citizen and in the broader 
competition between states. Computational power, in defining the speed at 
which machine learning models may trained and experimented on, shapes 
the speed at which the technology advances and therefore serves to define 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/
NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf.
18 White House National Science and Technology Council, The National Artificial 
Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan 21 (2016).
19 See e.g., Royal Society (Great Britain), Machine learning: the power and promise of 
computers that learn by example (2017) available at 
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/machine-learning/publications/machine-
learning-report.pdf; House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Robotics and 
Artificial Intelligence (2016), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/145/145.pdf; World 
Economic Forum, Assessing the Risk of Artificial Intelligence, Global Risks Report 2017, 
http://wef.ch/2izSQRP (last visited Mar 22, 2018); David Bollier, Artificial Intelligence: 
The Great Disruptor, Aspen Institute (2018) available at 
http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/AI2017.pdf.
8its broader economic impact. These impacts turn on more than simply the 
amount of processing power available, but on the details of computational 
architecture, supply chains, and the co-evolution of the machine learning 
field itself. 
To that end, the evolving research and commercial ecosystem around 
hardware is more than just a sideshow: shifts in these underlying 
technologies have a significant place in understanding the impact of AI on 
society as a whole. Parts II, III, and IV work to map these many connections 
by drawing the lines from the changing landscape of computational power 
to the bigger social challenges surrounding AI. 
PART II: SPECIALIZATION IN COMPUTATIONAL POWER
Computational power is not a simple matter of magnitude. The 
specific architecture of a chip plays a major role in determining whether or 
not it is effective in dealing with a given computational task. In general, the 
industry has tended towards increasingly specialized platforms for machine 
learning as the field continues to grow and attract commercial interest. In 
this sense, hardware has moved in a direction opposite to software: a shift 
towards narrower specialization in chips has proceeded even as the research 
field has been focused on building ever more general learning systems.
Two dynamics shape this marketplace for machine learning hardware. 
One is an inverse relationship between performance and flexibility.20 While 
general purpose computing power can take on a wide range of tasks and can 
be easily configured to take on new tasks, it tends to be outpaced by 
hardware which is built for a specific purpose.21 However, this increased 
performance comes at a cost: specialized hardware accommodates a 
relatively smaller set of use cases and has an architecture which is less easy 
to change after it is deployed.22 These specialized platforms are also 
frequently more expensive than commodified general platforms.23 One 
overarching question is whether the demand for machine learning driven 
20 See generally Inside the Microsoft FPGA-based configurable cloud, Channel 9, 
https://channel9.msdn.com/Events/Build/2017/B8063 (last visited Mar 20, 2018) 
(discussing these trade-offs).
21 See Griffin Lacey, Graham W. Taylor & Shawki Areibi, Deep Learning on FPGAs: 
Past, Present, and Future, arXiv:1602.04283, 6 (2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04283 
(last visited Feb 13, 2018) (discussing cost differentials).
22 Id.
23 Id.
9products and the research community will tend over time to favor 
architectures that are more or less flexible given this tradeoff. 
A second important dynamic is that the hardware for training a 
machine learning model to accomplish a task can differ significantly from 
the hardware used to conduct inference with an already trained model. This 
is due to the different demands at each step of the machine learning 
workflow. For instance, energy consumption may matter for a computer 
vision system operating on a mobile device, though it may not matter when 
that computer vision system is being trained initially in a data center.24 
Latency - the time delay between input and output of a system - might be a 
significant factor in a high-speed navigation context, where speed of 
inference would reduce the time needed for a course correction.25 However, 
as with energy consumption, latency may not prove to be as significant 
when the navigation system is being trained. These considerations influence 
what kinds of hardware are used at which points in the lifecycle of a 
machine learning system. They can be viewed as separate though 
overlapping markets, with hardware platforms being offered either for 
training or inference, and some offering support for both.26
Background: CPUs to GPUs
Graphics processing units (GPUs) form the present-day backbone of 
the machine learning workflow.27 GPUs are the primary platform for both 
training and inference, and are widely used both for basic research and in 
the practical development and deployment of machine learning driven 
products in the marketplace.28
The outsize role that GPUs play in machine learning is the result of an 
unexpected historical convergence. As their name suggests, GPUs were 
24 See Vivienne Sze et al., Efficient Processing of Deep Neural Networks: A Tutorial and 
Survey, arXiv:1703.09039, 5-6 (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09039 (last visited Feb 13, 
2018).
25 Id at 26.
26 See, e.g., Jeff Dean and Urs Hölzle, Build and train machine learning models on our new 
Google Cloud TPUs, Google (2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/google-cloud/google-
cloud-offer-tpus-machine-learning/ (last visited Mar 20, 2018) (earlier generations of 
Google’s specialized machine learning chips were focused on inference, with the latest 
version supporting both inference and training).
27 See Deloitte, Hitting the Accelerator: The Next Generation of Machine-Leaning Chips 
(2017), available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Images/infographics/technologyme
diatelecommunications/gx-deloitte-tmt-2018-nextgen-machine-learning-report.pdf.
28 Id. at 1.
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originally designed to support computer graphics and image processing 
applications.29 To accomplish this, GPUs feature an architecture which 
distributes computational tasks across a large number of cores to be 
processed in parallel.30 This is in contrast to central processing units 
(CPUs), which feature a smaller number of more powerful cores that are 
optimized for handling just a few tasks simultaneously.31
This parallel architecture allows the GPU to be uniquely well suited 
for machine learning applications. At its root, neural network training and 
inference relies on the execution of a large number of identical matrix 
multiplication calculations.32 This uniformity enables these operations to be 
parallelized and distributed across the many cores offered by the GPU.33 
This enables the GPU to outperform CPU architectures which have 
comparatively more powerful processors but manage tasks in a more serial 
format.34
Increasing Specialization: FPGAs and ASICs
The repurposing of GPUs as the primary hardware platform for 
machine learning reflects a selection among available technologies. As 
interest in machine learning has continued to grow, so has the notion of 
developing hardware entirely purpose-built for these applications become 
more attractive. Discussion within the industry has focused on the 
possibility of using field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and 
application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) as the next primary 
platforms for machine learning.35
FPGAs are distinct from CPUs and GPUs in that they do not run 
programs in stored memory. Instead, they are collection of standardized 
“logic blocks” whose relationships can be configured by a programmer 
29 Id. at 2.
30 See supra note 10.
31 Id.
32 See supra note 22 at 12.
33 See supra note 10.
34 See Cade Metz, The Race To Build An AI Chip For Everything Just Got Real, WIRED, 
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/race-make-ai-chips-everything-heating-fast/ (last visited 
Feb 13, 2018) (describing some of the limitations of the CPU).
35 See, e.g., Karl Freund, Will ASIC Chips Become The Next Big Thing In AI?, Forbes, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/moorinsights/2017/08/04/will-asic-chips-become-the-next-
big-thing-in-ai/ (last visited Mar 20, 2018).
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once the chip is received from a manufacturer.36 ASICs are purpose-built 
chip boards which are specific to a purpose and cannot be easily 
reconfigured after they are manufactured.37
FPGAs and ASICs are particularly attractive in the context of 
machine learning inference. Both devices consume less energy than CPUs 
and GPUs, and their specialization allows for greater speed.38 These gains 
come at the loss of flexibility and an increased cost. FPGAs and ASICs 
cannot be as easily and quickly configured to run a wide range of tasks. 
Both are relatively more expensive when compared with CPUs and GPUs. 
This is particularly the case with ASICs, which are “bespoke” projects that 
are expensive and time-consuming to produce. This makes them cost-
effective as a platform only in significant quantities.39
However, these benefits may outweigh the costs, particularly in 
circumstances where a specific kind of machine learning inference is 
reliably needed at a mass scale. Project Catapult, an initiative launched by 
Microsoft, has shown high performance for FPGAs as the core computing 
unit in their data centers.40 FPGAs and ASICs have also been considered a 
promising approach in the autonomous vehicles context, where the tasks a 
machine learning system will need to take on will be relatively stable and 
where chips will be needed for a large number of vehicles.41
36 See What is an FPGA? Field Programmable Gate Array, 
https://www.xilinx.com/products/silicon-devices/fpga/what-is-an-fpga.html (last visited 
Mar 20, 2018).
37 Jeff Dean, Machine Learning for Systems and Systems for Machine Learning, NIPS 
2017, available at http://learningsys.org/nips17/assets/slides/dean-nips17.pdf (noting the 
design challenges with ASICs).
38 See supra notes 19-20.
39 Id.
40 See Kalin Ovtcharov et al., Accelerating deep convolutional neural networks using 
specialized hardware, Microsoft Research Whitepaper, 2 (2015), available at 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/CNN20Whitepaper.pdf.
41 See, e.g., ASIC might be the mainstream chip for autonomous driving, a chance for 
Chinese start-ups, VehicleTrend, https://www.vehicle-trend.com/Knowledge/20180108-
1131.html (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Phil Kalaf, Self-Driving Cars, Wireless Data? It’s 
Time to Thank the Humble FPGA. IDS (2017), http://www.idsforward.com/wireless-data-
thank-humble-fpga/ (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Yu Wang et al, Reconfigurable Processor 
for Deep Learning in Autonomous Vehicles, 
https://www.itu.int/en/journal/001/Documents/itu2017-2.pdf (2017); Harsh Chauhan, 
Can Intel Dominate This Market by Overcoming This Smaller Rival? The Motley Fool 
(2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/11/24/can-intel-dominate-this-market-by-
12
While FPGAs and ASICs seem to show promise in the inference 
context, they have traditionally had some limitations that have made them 
less attractive as platforms for training. For one, FPGAs and ASICs have 
tended to be less accurate, relying on “fixed point” computation or featuring 
comparatively limited floating-point performance.42 This has made them 
comparatively limited in performing the accurate level of calculation 
needed in the training process. These devices have also had limited external 
memory bandwidth, preventing them from efficiently conducting the matrix 
multiplication needed for training.43
However, the potential speed and energy consumption gains presented 
by FPGA and ASIC architectures have encouraged research which appears 
to be eliminating some of these limitations over time. In 2017, Intel 
researchers released software which maximizes data reuse and minimizes 
external memory bandwidth to boost training performance on FPGAs.44 The 
latest generation of Google’s “Tensor Processing Unit” (TPU), a specialized 
ASIC, supports both training and inference.45 The claimed improvements 
are quite significant. One recent talk from Google in 2017 noted that the 
TPU ASIC was able to execute training tasks at ten to fourteen times the 
speed of their previous production setups with a relatively smaller number 
of machines.46
Moving Forwards
It remains unclear whether or not more specialized, less flexible 
hardware will unseat the preeminent place of the GPU in machine learning 
training and inference. Producers of FPGAs and ASICs are releasing 
performance benchmarks showing significant improvements over the GPU 
for both kinds of tasks. Google claims that its TPU ASIC is able to conduct 
overcoming-this.aspx (last visited Feb 20, 2018) (noting the application of FPGAs in the 
autonomous vehicles context).
42 See Brian Bailey, Machine Learning’s Growing Divide, Semiconductor Engineering, 
https://semiengineering.com/machine-learnings-growing-divide/ (last visited Mar 12, 2018) 
(reviewing these issues); Understanding Peak Floating-Point Performance Claims, 
https://www.altera.com/en_US/pdfs/literature/wp/wp-01222-understanding-peak-floating-
point-performance-claims.pdf (last visited Feb 15, 2018) (reviewing the floating point 
issues in more depth).
43 Id.
44 Utku Aydonat et al., An OpenCL(TM) Deep Learning Accelerator on Arria 10, 
arXiv:1701.03534 [cs] (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.03534 (last visited Mar 12, 2018).
45 See supra note 34.
46 See supra note 34 (describing these improvements).
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inference fifteen to thirty times faster than contemporary GPUs and CPUs.47 
In a similar vein, Graphcore - one prominent startup focusing on specialized 
machine learning hardware - claims that eight of its proprietary “IPU” cards 
are equivalent to 128 contemporary GPUs.48 
Despite this, benchmarking issues persist and it is challenging to 
evaluate these claims in a systematic way.49 For its part, GPU leader Nvidia 
has challenged the performance claimed by Google of its TPUs, noting that 
it failed to compare its chips against its latest generation of hardware.50 At 
the moment, the semiconductor industry does not yet have a common 
scheme for evaluating the performance of machine learning specialized 
hardware as it does in the CPU space.51 This is significant because the 
specific architecture of the neural network and how it is implemented can 
have a significant impact on reported performance.52 
Though some commentators have framed the industry choices 
between GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs as a mutually exclusive ones, it is not 
clear that this will be the case in practice.53 Even if FPGA and ASIC 
designs do not ultimately become a new standard for training and inference 
in machine learning writ large, it seems likely that they will become a 
natural option for certain applications of machine learning systems, 
particularly in the consumer products context. Recent moves by industry 
leaders seems to recognize this reality. Despite its leadership and 
championing of a GPU-focused model, Nvidia’s latest Drive PX product 
features a specialized “Deep Learning Accelerator” (DLA) module as it 
47 Norman P. Jouppi et al, In-Datacenter Performance Analysis of a Tensor Processing 
Unit, https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1704/1704.04760.pdf (last visited Feb 15, 2018).
48 Graphcore Benchmarks, Presentation at NIPS 2017, available at 
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/729091/NIPS2017/NIPS%2017%20-
%20benchmarks%20final.pdf?t=1521107772551.
49 See supra note 22, at 26-27 (describing the many influences on chip performance).
50 Jensen Huang, AI Drives the Rise of Accelerated Computing in Data Centers, Nvidia 
Blog, https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2017/04/10/ai-drives-rise-accelerated-computing-
datacenter/ (Apr 10, 2017).
51 See, e.g., SPEC CPU 2017, https://www.spec.org/cpu2017/.
52 See supra note 22, at 26-27.
53 See, e.g., FPGA Based Deep Learning Accelerators Take on ASICs, The Next Platform 
(2016), https://www.nextplatform.com/2016/08/23/fpga-based-deep-learning-accelerators-
take-asics/ (last visited Feb 13, 2018); Does the future lie with CPU+GPU or 
CPU+FPGA?,  Scientific Computing World, https://www.scientific-
computing.com/news/analysis-opinion/does-future-lie-cpugpu-or-cpufpga (last visited Feb 
20, 2018).
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attempts to cater to applications in autonomous vehicles.54 Nvidia has also 
open-sourced its designs for the DLA, a move likely to drive down the cost 
of this specialized hardware going forwards by enabling others to 
manufacture the same designs.55
These trends provide a framework for thinking about the economics 
of various machine learning applications, and how and where the 
technology might be used in practice. To that end, it begs the question of 
how these shifts in hardware specialization might influence the overall 
impact of machine learning on society and the governance of the 
technology. 
Impact: The Geography of Training and Inference
Machine learning is not an abstract force, but a computational task 
that takes place somewhere. Hardware capabilities and the particular 
economics of processors are critical since they define the spatial dimensions 
of machine learning and what it likely to be applied towards.
Power consumption defines whether or not machine learning 
computation can be done on a small, mobile device, or must have access to 
a reliable and continuous power source. High energy costs limit the ability 
to embed machine learning systems directly on a device. In the very least, it 
limits the application of machine learning to situations with sufficient 
connectivity for a device to communicate with a larger pool of 
computational power hosted in the “cloud.”56
Latency is also crucial in this respect. Even if a chip is able to operate 
at low power on a mobile device, it may be ineffectual for a particular use in 
the field if it is insufficiently responsive for the intended purpose. This acts 
as a bar to certain real-time or mission-critical uses of machine learning 
where an alternative cloud architecture would also produce similarly 
unacceptable levels of latency. 
54 Karl Freund, Why Nvidia is Building Its Own TPU, Forbes, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/moorinsights/2017/05/15/why-nvidia-is-building-its-own-tpu 
(last visited Mar 20, 2017).
55 See Tom Simonite, To Compete With New Rivals, Chipmaker Nvidia Shares Its Secrets, 
WIRED, Sept 29, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/to-compete-with-new-rivals-
chipmaker-nvidia-shares-its-secrets/ (last visited Feb 20, 2018).
56 See supra note 22, at 5-6 (discussing these different configurations).
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Power consumption and latency are barriers to the application of 
machine learning within certain domains. This includes the placement of 
these systems on small devices with an untethered power source, and in low 
bandwidth situations with poor connectivity. The rise of ASICs and FPGAs 
- as well as ongoing improvements to GPUs - suggest that machine learning 
hardware will erode these limitations on the placement of machine learning 
systems over time, particularly for mass produced consumer products that 
have economies of scale.
The Geography of Inference
These developments offer a mixed blessing to those concerned about 
the harmful possibilities of machine learning inference. Machine learning 
can increasingly be integrated into a range of different products and services 
and used in situations where it was previously considered impractical to do 
so. For civil libertarians, FPGAs and ASICs enable the expansion of 
machine learning as a means of conducting surveillance: small, low power 
devices can now incorporate the advances of computer vision to recognize 
people and objects even in areas with low bandwidth. For those worried 
about the misuse of machine learning by “bad actors”, specialized hardware 
makes it more possible to benefit from the technology without reliance on 
cloud services where harmful activity might be more easily tracked and 
halted.57
Also concerning is the fact that the more inflexible architectures of 
FPGAs and ASICs might potentially make it more challenging to repair 
machine learning systems when flaws are discovered. A growing body of 
research continues to highlight the point both that machine learning systems 
frequently can render biased, discriminatory results, and are potentially 
vulnerable to malicious manipulation.58 Where a trained machine learning 
model is “hard wired” into a chip, the discovery that it has these flaws may 
make repair a more expensive and protracted process as it requires a 
57 For a review of these concerns, see, e.g., Miles Brundage et al, The Malicious Use of 
Artificial Intelligence (2018), available at https://maliciousaireport.com/.
58 See, e.g., Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, PMLR 81:1–15, 2018, available at 
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf; Solon Barocas & 
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact (2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2477899 (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Ian Goodfellow et al, 
Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial Examples, OpenAI Blog (2017), 
https://blog.openai.com/adversarial-example-research/ (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Tom B. 
Brown et al., Adversarial Patch, arXiv:1712.09665 [cs] (2017), 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.09665 (last visited Mar 21, 2018).
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replacement of the processor itself, rather than modification of software. 
This problem applies with particular force in an “embedded” setting where 
chips are sold and distributed with a product and there is no centralized 
means of changing their behavior once they have left the factory. 
At the same time, FPGAs and ASICs also raise the possibility that 
machine learning may be architected in a more robustly privacy-protecting 
ways going forwards. Since specialized computing power enables machine 
learning inference to be done on the device itself, it also opens the 
possibility that machine learning capabilities might be provided without 
ever having personal data leave a device. Consider a computer vision 
system which helps users quickly sort through their photos to find friends 
and family members. At present, the energy costs of inference might require 
that these photos be uploaded from a smartphone to a central server to be 
processed and tagged.59 Specialized hardware might enable an alternative 
architecture in which the machine learning model is embedded on the 
smartphone itself, such that the photos themselves do not need to be shared 
with a third-party to be analyzed by the system.60 
This remains up the air as FPGAs and ASICs for machine learning 
enter the scene and attempt to find viable niches in the application of the 
technology. The economics of these hardware platforms will influence the 
viability of alternative architectures in various markets, and in doing so will 
inform whether advocates and policymakers are able to argue for the 
feasibility of more privacy sensitive approaches to machine learning going 
forwards.
The Geography of Training
It is important to recognize that the geography of training may look 
quite different from the geography of inference.61 As discussed above, 
FPGAs and ASICs have been traditionally somewhat limited as platforms 
for the training of machine learning systems. While the possibilities of 
using specialized hardware for training continue to be developed by Google 
59 See supra note 22 at 5-6.
60 See, e.g., Ben Popper, Google’s new Clips camera is invasive, creepy, and perfect for a 
parent like me The Verge (2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/5/16428708/google-
clips-camera-privacy-parents-children (last visited Mar 21, 2018) (describing an 
architecture along these lines).
61 Nvidia, GPU-Based Deep Learning Inference: A Performance and Power Analysis, 4-5 
(2015), available at https://www.nvidia.com/content/tegra/embedded-
systems/pdf/jetson_tx1_whitepaper.pdf (noting the differing demands of training and 
inference).
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and other companies, the reality in the near-term seems to be that training 
will remain the province of the GPU for many researchers and practitioners. 
Combined with the fact that training is likely to continue being 
computationally intensive for the foreseeable future, it is likely that the 
creation of machine learning models will continue to happen within 
centralized data centers. 
FPGAs and ASICs therefore seem likely to have a differential impact 
on the geography of machine learning. In the past, pre-existing data center 
infrastructure, business models, and the energy consumption of existing 
processors tended to encourage an architecture where training and inference 
were situated in the same, centralized locations. As this specialized 
hardware matures, it seems likely to encourage a more distributed pattern in 
inference, permitting the application of machine learning “on device” in a 
broader set of contexts. At the same time, the continuing computational 
costs and energy requirements of training mean that the creation of machine 
learning systems will continue to largely take place in a relatively smaller 
number of central facilities.
This geographic pattern has implications for the governance of 
machine learning. Training of the most complex, sophisticated models will 
continue to take place in a small number of locations among the set of 
actors who have the financial resources to maintain or rent the 
computational power necessary. However, once trained, machine learning 
models can be increasingly diffused and distributed. No doubt some types 
of machine learning models will continue to be offered “as a service,” with 
inference taking place in the cloud. However, FPGAs and ASICs open the 
door to inference no longer being tethered in this particular way. 
Simultaneously, these platforms - ASICs in particular - are more inflexible, 
making modifications after distribution more difficult.
Whereas in the past it was more possible to repair flaws in machine 
learning models after training and deployment by directly modifying the 
model provided to many endpoints through the cloud, the specialization of 
hardware suggests an environment where these harms may be more 
challenging to rectify in the post-training phase. “Hard-wired” chips may be 
difficult to recall quickly, or otherwise difficult to modify when in the field. 
This may put increased pressure on companies to engage in more thorough 
pre-deployment checks and verification on these systems, rather than 
adopting a development approach that takes a more “launch-and-iterate” 
stance. From a governance perspective, these less easily rectifiable 
downstream harms may push regulators towards an approach that puts a 
18
growing set of responsibilities on the entities creating and providing 
platforms for creating machine learning models to take precautions prior to 
wider distribution. 
It is worth recognizing that the continued development of the machine 
learning field may alter this balance over time. Progress continues to be 
made in the subfield of federated learning - which envisions an architecture 
in which many independent, distributed processors train locally and share 
updates to a model with one another.62 This work may become more 
practically feasible to implement as ASICs for machine learning mature and 
increasingly allow embedded training to happen on a device. Breakthroughs 
in one-shot learning, which would enable the effective training of models 
with a relatively smaller number of examples, might also lower the 
computational bar to executing training tasks in a more distributed way.63 
PART III: SUPPLY CHAIN AND COMPUTATIONAL POWER
CPUs, GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs are all ultimately products in a 
complex global supply chain for semiconductors. Beyond simply 
connecting changing computational architectures to the social impact of 
machine learning as we did in the previous section, we can dig deeper to 
examine how the commercial specifics of its manufacture also has broader 
implications. 
Both the geography of semiconductor manufacturing and its place as a 
strategic asset in the context of national security make it likely that 
computing power will become an important arena in the geopolitics of AI. 
This seems to be particularly the case as China increasingly invests in 
becoming a leader in machine learning while continuing an ongoing effort 
to reshape the global semiconductor industry.
The Semiconductor Supply Chain
The hardware platforms discussed in Part II are just one facet of the 
much broader industry for semiconductors. Semiconductor chips, “tiny 
62 See, e.g., Jakub Konečný et al., Federated Optimization: Distributed Machine Learning 
for On-Device Intelligence, arXiv:1610.02527 [cs] (2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02527 
(last visited Mar 21, 2018).
63 See, e.g., Adam Santoro et al., One-shot Learning with Memory-Augmented Neural 
Networks, arXiv:1605.06065 [cs] (2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.06065 (last visited Mar 
21, 2018).
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electronic device[s] comprised of billions of components that store, move, 
and process data” are the “enabling technology of the information age.”64 
These chips give computers the power to run software applications, and are 
the key building block for a range of other devices “from cell phones and 
gaming systems to aircraft and industrial machinery to military equipment 
and weapons.”65 Not surprisingly given their broad scope of application, 
semiconductors are a massive global industry. In 2015, worldwide 
semiconductor sales were $335 billion, growing 15% since 2012.66
Many production steps are required to deliver a finished 
semiconductor chip. Some companies are “integrated device 
manufacturers”, or IDMs, which manage all aspects of semiconductor 
production from start to finish. This includes design, manufacturing, 
assembly, testing, and packaging.67 Companies adopting this model include 
Intel, Samsung, and Texas Instruments.68
However, many businesses specialize only in a particular part of this 
supply chain, contracting out tasks to other companies in the ecosystem as 
needed. Of particular importance in the discussion of machine learning 
hardware is the role of so-called “fabless foundries.” These businesses focus 
on the design of semiconductor chips, and contract out the manufacturing, 
often called “fabrication,” of the final product.69 Companies adopting this 
model include AMD, Broadcom, and Qualcomm.70 Many of the companies 
leading the development of machine learning specific hardware are 
“fabless”. This allows these businesses to avoid the massive capital outlay 
and expense of building and maintaining a chip “fab”. Building a single 
advanced plant for fabricating semiconductors can cost up to $20 billion.71
64 Michaela D. Platzer and John F. Sargent Jr., U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing: 
Industry Trends, Global Competition, Federal Policy, Congressional Research Service 1 
(2016) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44544.pdf (last visited Feb 13, 2018).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Cf. Semiconductor Industry Association, Beyond Borders: The Global Semiconductor 
Value Chain 7 (2016), available at 
https://www.semiconductors.org/document_library_and_resources/trade/beyond_borders_t
he_global_semiconductor_value_chain/.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 TSMC Ready to Spend $20 Billion on its Most Advanced Chip Plant, Bloomberg.com, 
October 6, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-06/tsmc-ready-to-
spend-20-billion-on-its-most-advanced-chip-plant (last visited Mar 20, 2018).
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The market for GPUs has been dominated by Nvidia, a fabless 
foundry. One industry analysis concluded that, as of the third quarter of 
2017, Nvidia represented 72.8% of the market share for GPUs, with the rest 
being controlled by AMD, another fabless foundry.72 Both are 
headquartered in Santa Clara, California. 
The market for FPGAs has also been dominated by a small set of 
fabless foundries. In 2016, Xilinx led this segment with a market share of 
53%.73 Altera, another FPGA specialist, was purchased by Intel in 2015 and 
accounted for 36% of the market.74 These were distantly followed by 
competitors Microsemi (7%) and Lattice Semiconductor (3%).75 This 
roughly holds stable from the market share in 2015.76 All of these 
companies are based in the United States. All but one, Lattice 
Semiconductor, are headquartered in California.77 
Estimating market share in the context of specialized machine 
learning ASICs is more challenging. For one, the market is still emerging: 
no major player in the space is currently engaging in mass production and 
public sale of ASICs as a platform for machine learning. At the time of 
writing, Google is only distributing their TPU ASIC to a relatively small 
circle of researchers, and offers limited access to TPU computing cycles via 
its cloud services.78 In any case, because these chips are highly customized 
for particular purposes, it may be challenging to eventually define a single 
“market” which usefully groups together the different types of devices that 
might be fabricated as an ASIC for machine learning. 
72 Harsh Chauhan, Nvidia Is Running Away With the GPU Market The Motley Fool 
(2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/12/06/nvidia-is-running-away-with-the-gpu-
market.aspx (last visited Feb 20, 2018).
73 And the Winner of Best FPGA of 2016 is... | EE Times, EETimes, 
https://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1331443 (last visited Feb 20, 
2018).
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76 Id.
77 Xilinx, Corporate Locations, https://www.xilinx.com/about/contact/corporate-
locations.html; Intel Programmable Solutions Group (PSG) Locations, 
https://www.altera.com/about/contact/contact/altera-hq.html; Microsemi, Locations, 
https://www.microsemi.com/locations; Lattice Semiconductor, Locations, 
http://www.latticesemi.com/About.
78 Google is giving a cluster of 1,000 Cloud TPUs to researchers for free, TechCrunch 
(2017), http://social.techcrunch.com/2017/05/17/the-tensorflow-research-cloud-program-
gives-the-latest-cloud-tpus-to-scientists/ (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Cloud TPUs - ML 
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Since the major leaders in machine learning hardware are “fabless”, 
they depend on a separate ecosystem of companies to provide the actual 
fabrication of the chips they design. These companies, called “pure play 
foundries” or simply “foundries”, are a highly consolidated marketplace. In 
2016, Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) accounted for 59% of the global 
market for fabrication.79 Running significantly behind were 
GlobalFoundries (11%), United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) (9%), 
and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) (6%).
80 TSMC and UMC are based in Taiwan, with SMIC in China and 
GlobalFoundries in the US.81 While based in the US, GlobalFoundries is 
owned by the Emirate of Abu Dhabi through its state-owned investment 
arm Advanced Technology Investment Company (ATIC).82
There exists a network of somewhat stable relationships between this 
handful of leading “fabless” foundries that are designing much of the 
hardware that machine learning takes place on, and the small number of 
companies that do their manufacturing. In the GPU space, Nvidia contracts 
much of its high-performance GPU production to TSMC.83 In 2009, 
GlobalFoundries was spun-off from AMD as part of a transition of the latter 
towards a “fabless” model.84 As a result of this historical relationship, AMD 
has traditionally worked closely with GlobalFoundries, though recently 
79 Pure-Play Foundry Market Surges 11% in 2016 to Reach $50 Billion!, , 
http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/PurePlay-Foundry-Market-Surges-11-In-2016-
To-Reach-50-Billion/ (last visited Feb 20, 2018).
80 Id.
81 TSMC, Business Contacts, 
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http://www.umc.com/english/contact/index.asp; SMIC, About Us, 
http://www.smics.com/eng/about/about.php; GlobalFoundries, About Us, 
https://www.globalfoundries.com/about-us.
82 Mark LaPedus, ATIC takes control of GlobalFoundries | EE Times, EETimes, 
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1258215 (last visited Mar 21, 2018).
83 See Nvidia: TSMC will remain a ‘very important’ foundry partner, KitGuru (2015), 
https://www.kitguru.net/components/graphic-cards/anton-shilov/nvidia-tsmc-will-remain-
a-very-important-foundry-partner/ (last visited Feb 20, 2018); Ashraf Eassa, NVIDIA 
Corp.’s Relationship With Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Is Deepening The 
Motley Fool (2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/05/17/nvidia-corp-relationship-
taiwan-semiconductor.aspx (last visited Mar 21, 2018).
84 Benjamin Pimentel, GlobalFoundries created from AMD spin-off MarketWatch, 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/globalfoundries-created-amd-spin-off-the (last visited 
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announced that they will be splitting their new GPU production between 
them and TSMC.85
FPGA production operates with a slightly different set of connections 
between chip designers and associated foundries. Xilinx has worked in the 
past with UMC though increasingly partners with TSMC on its more recent 
hardware.86 Altera was acquired by Intel in 2015 and relies in part on its 
corporate parent for fabrication services.87 Microsemi announced in 2013 
that it too would work with Intel for its fabrication needs.88 Lattice 
Semiconductor works with both UMC and TSMC, along with some smaller 
foundries.89
The geographic distribution of these players is mirrored in the overall 
structure of the industry. US firms account for the largest share of the global 
market, accounting for 50% of semiconductor sales in 2016.90 However, the 
actual fabrication of semiconductor devices largely takes place outside of 
the United States. In 2015, about three-quarters of the world’s advanced 
semiconductor fabrication capacity was located in South Korea, Taiwan, 
Japan, and China.91 This continues a historical trend of production capacity 
moving from the US to the Asia-Pacific region. In 1980 the US accounted 
for 42% of global manufacturing capacity, a number which dropped 
consistently over subsequent years to 16% by 2007.92
US National Security and the Semiconductor Industry
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90 See supra note 61 at 2.
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Given the importance of semiconductors to the supply chain of 
consumer and military electronics, the industry has “[f]or decades” been 
considered relevant to national security within the US.93 Concerns about the 
shift of semiconductor manufacturing capacity to the Asia-Pacific region 
have also dominated this discussion for decades, beginning with the rise of 
the Japanese semiconductor industry in the 1970s.94 Worries about this 
transition has resulted in a range of different regulatory interventions in past 
decades to bolster and secure the US semiconductor industry, and block 
foreign access to the most cutting edge computational power. 
Export controls in high-performance computing have been one 
important way these concerns have manifested as policy. Under Executive 
Order 13222, the US Commerce Department regulates exports of high 
performance computers (HPC) to certain countries, which are grouped into 
tiers.95 Computers exceeding certain thresholds of processor performance to 
particular countries and end-users require prior government review for 
export.96 These exports may be blocked on national security and anti-
terrorism grounds.97  
Fears around reliance on foreign manufacturing have also resulted in 
more extensive coordination between government and corporate actors. In 
2004, the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Security 
Agency (NSA) initiated a “Trusted Foundry Program”, which arranged for 
long-term contracts with accredited US companies to ensure that the 
government would have guaranteed access to trusted chips for its needs.98 
In practice, this program would center on a sole-source contract with IBM, 
which was deemed “the only U.S.-based company able to meet DOD and 
intelligence community needs for trusted leading-edge microelectronics.”99 
While the program eventually expanded to include other trusted suppliers, 
one 2015 analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
observed that IBM remained the only supplier with cutting-edge fabrication 
93 Supra note 61 at 21.
94 Id. at 18-19. For a contemporaneous review, see Warren E. Davis & Daryl G. Hatano, 
The American Semiconductor Industry and the Ascendancy of East Asia, 27 California 
Management Review 128 (1985).
95 Exec. Order No. 13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44025 (Aug 22, 2001); Bureau of Industry and 
Security, US Department of Commerce, Legal Authority for the Export Administration 
Regulations, 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/Export%20Administration%20Regulations
%20Training/876-legal-authority-for-the-export-administration-regulations/file.
96 15 CFR § 774, Supplement No. 1.
97 Id.
98 Supra note 61 at 22.
99 Id.
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facilities and that “use of accredited suppliers other than IBM has been 
minimal” as a result.100
This program is at present in transition. In 2014, IBM announced that 
it would transfer ownership of its foundries to the foreign owned 
GlobalFoundries.101 This sale followed significant losses for IBM on its 
foundry business. During 2013 and 2014 the company lost $700 million on 
its two primary chip fabrication facilities, and in the end IBM paid $1.5 
billion to GlobalFoundries for the acquisition.102 This transfer was approved 
and included a multi-year contract with the DOD to provide semiconductors 
to the US government until 2023.103 However, the 2015 GAO analysis 
concluded simply that “there are no near-term alternatives to the foundry 
services formerly provided by IBM.”104 As of late 2018, efforts are ongoing 
to identify “new approaches to retain trustable, leading-edge capabilities”.
105
Broader coordination has also happened in the past. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, concern around rising Japanese dominance in the space 
motivated the launch of SEMATECH, a public-private research consortium 
of US semiconductor firms.106 Over subsequent years, $870 million in 
public subsidies from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and augmented by matching funds from the participating 
companies focused on accelerating research into semiconductor 
manufacturing.107 In 1996, after a period of growing US market share in 
semiconductors, the directors of SEMATECH voted to stop receiving 
federal funding.108
Many factors enabled the resurgence of the US semiconductor 
industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the ultimate impact of 
100 Marie A. Mak, Trusted Defense Microelectronics: Future Access and Capabilities Are 
Uncertain, Congressional Research Service 4 (2015), available at 
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SEMATECH has been disputed.109 However, consensus favors the positive 
role the consortium played. One 2003 review by the National Academies 
concluded that the public-private effort was “key among elements in the 
industry’s revival—contributing respectively to the restoration of financial 
health and product quality.”110
Recent US Focus in the Space: China
Concerns around the robustness of the US semiconductor industry 
have persisted into the present as China has made a concerted push to 
advance its own semiconductor industry in recent years. In 2014, the State 
Council of China published National Guidelines for Development and 
Promotion of the Integrated Circuit (IC) Industry, a strategic plan which 
aims to establish national leadership across the semiconductor supply chain 
by 2030.111 The plan allocates $100 to $150 billion from public and private 
investment to support this effort.112 Goals declared later in 2015 would 
imply ambitions that “roughly all incremental foundry capacity installed 
globally over the next ten years would have to be in China.113 
One result of this strategy has been a rapid expansion in acquisition 
activity by Chinese investment and technology companies. Some larger 
transactions in the space include a $2.3 billion acquisition of H3C, a Hong 
Kong subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard114, a $2.75 billion acquisition of NXP 
Semiconductor’s “Standard Products” division, and a $1.8 billion 
acquisition of Omnvision, which specializes in semiconductors for imaging 
applications.115 One analysis in late 2017 estimated that “the total volume of 
transactions of China’s semiconductor overseas M&As (completed) so far 
has exceeded US$11 billion.”116 It has also been reflected in a significant 
increase in the construction of new chip fabrication plants in the country. 
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Roughly 40% of front-end semiconductor fabs slated to begin operation in 
2017 to 2020 worldwide are located in China.117
This effort has also included the recruitment of several high-profile 
leaders within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This includes the 
recent move in 2017 by Shih-wei Sun, former CEO of Taiwan’s UMC 
foundry, to China’s Tsinghua Unigroup.118 Similarly, Shang-Yi Chiang and 
Liang Mong-song, both research leaders at Taiwan’s TSMC, were recruited 
to China’s SMIC that same year.119 These moves have produced some 
alarm within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. TSMC chairperson 
Morris Chang has voiced concerns that the industry may become a “one 
way road” where “talent only departs and never arrives.”120
These efforts are directed towards catching up: China has not 
traditionally been a leader in the semiconductor sector. While it accounts for 
a large percentage of worldwide consumption (57% in 2014), it largely 
relies on imports to meet this demand.121 As of 2015, China possessed only 
around 6% of the most advanced semiconductor fabs globally.122 One report 
noted that many fabrication plans continued to use “older technology and 
used equipment”, which reflected China’s focus on products that “do not 
require leading-edge semiconductors.”123 These recent efforts also follow 
on earlier, less successful initiatives by the Chinese government to 
accelerate the development of their national semiconductor base.124 
However, the present effort differs in its focus on fostering a defined set of 
117 Dylan McGrath, China to house over 40% of semi fabs by 2020, EE Times Asia, 
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national “champions” to compete internationally, rather than spreading 
financial support more thinly throughout the economy.125
The US has been active in attempting to counter these efforts. In 
2016, then Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker declared that the US 
would “not allow any nation to dominate this [the semiconductor] industry 
and impede innovation through unfair trade practices and massive, non-
market-based state intervention.”126 An expert committee convened by the 
NSA and the Department of Energy (DOE) that same year agreed, 
“expressing significant concern that – absent aggressive action by the U.S. – 
the U.S. will lose leadership and not control its own future in HPC [high-
performance computing].”127
Several steps were taken towards this end. President Obama 
authorized the National Strategic Computing Initiative in 2015, which 
directed the DOD, DOE, and the National Science Foundation to work to 
“preserve [the US] leadership role in creating HPC technology”.128 In 2015, 
the administration restricted the sales of advanced microprocessors to 
several research sites associated with the Chinese supercomputer Tianhe-2.
129 The administration also blocked the acquisition of the US based assets of 
Aixtron, a German semiconductor manufacturer, by China’s Fujian Grand 
Chip Investment Fund.130 Similar deals were canceled on the threat of 
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rejection by the Obama administration through the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency group “authorized 
to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a 
foreign person…in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the 
national security of the United States.”131 This included the sinking of a 
2015 offer by China Resources Microelectronics and Hua Capital 
Management to acquire US-based Fairchild Semiconductor.132 
The Trump administration has maintained the active stance of the 
Obama administration in limiting foreign acquisition of US semiconductor 
companies. In 2017, CFIUS blocked a proposed acquisition of Lattice 
Semiconductor, a leading FPGA producer, by China Venture Capital Fund 
Corporation (CVCF), a state-run investment arm.133 The decision cited 
“credible evidence that the foreign interest exercising control might take 
action that threatens to impair national security” and the “importance of 
semiconductor supply chain integrity to the U.S. government, and the use of 
Lattice products by the U.S. government.”134 In 2018, using the same 
authority and citing similar concerns, the Trump administration blocked a 
proposed $117 billion acquisition of Qualcomm by Singapore-based 
competitor Broadcom.135 The administration similarly blocked a $580 
million offer to acquire Xcerra, a Massachusetts-based semiconductor 
company, by state-backed investment funds Sino IC Capital and Hubei 
Xinyan that same year.136 In late 2017, a bipartisan group proposed the 
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Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA).137 The bill 
would expand CFIUS review to include a range of transactions beyond 
outright acquisition, and would raise review in situations where an 
emerging technology prospectively “could be essential to national security.”
138
Impact: Computational Power and the Geopolitics of Machine Learning
From a geopolitical standpoint, the semiconductor industry finds itself 
in the middle of a perfect storm. First, semiconductor manufacturing 
capacity is considered a vital strategic asset, and the issue of who owns 
these businesses and their intellectual property is considered a national 
security matter. Second, the evolution of the industry has produced a 
bifurcated geography, with design-focused “fabless” foundries largely 
based in the US but with actual production taking place in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The result is that the semiconductor industry, like others, has been 
increasingly drawn into international politics as tensions escalate between 
the US and China.
This broader backdrop suggests that the more specific technology of 
machine learning is likely to be a flashpoint in the larger context of 
semiconductor competition between the US and China. In July 2017, the 
Chinese State Council released its “New Generation AI Development Plan”, 
which sets out targets for development in AI and related industries. The 
plan declares AI to be “a new focus of international competition” and “a 
strategic technology that will lead in the future”.139 It plans for China to 
“firmly seize the strategic initiative in the new stage of international 
competition in AI development” and “effectively [protect] national 
security.”140 Specifically, the plan aims for China to be the world’s 
“primary” leader in the technology and for the technology to be a $150 
billion industry in the country by 2030.141 As in the semiconductor context, 
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this plan echoes and builds on a series of earlier published policies focusing 
on robotics and other emerging technologies.142
There are a number of components to the State Council strategy. For 
one, the Chinese government intends to ramp up spending to support the 
development of AI in the country. Its Artificial Intelligence 2.0 program is 
poised to deploy “billions to develop AI for commercial and military use.”
143 This will also be supported by a system of “government guidance funds” 
that provide financial support to companies and new ventures working on 
AI and related technologies.144 The plan also contemplates recruiting and 
accelerating the training of leading AI researchers in the fields of “neural 
awareness, machine learning, automatic driving, intelligent robots, and 
other areas.”145
Advancing computational power appears as a consistent theme in 
these plans. The State Council plan highlights the lack of “high-end chips” 
as a factor in China lagging in the field of AI.146 The Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT), in elaborating on the State Council 
Plan, has explicitly laid out the “[development of] high-performance, 
scalable, and low-power cloud neural network chips for machine learning 
training applications” as a key priority.147 It also distinguishes between the 
cloud and the separate need to advance chips to support “terminal” 
embedded applications, where “low-power, high-performance neural 
network chips suitable for machine learning algorithms” are needed.148 By 
2020, MIIT targets chips which will have “performance levels of 128 
TFLOPS (16-bit floating point), and the energy efficiency ratio of more 
142 See, e.g., Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, The 13th Five-Year Plan 
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than 1 TFLOPS/Watt” with “terminal” chips having a similar efficiency.149 
Consistent with these policies, in August 2017 China’s State Development 
& Investment Corporation led a $100 million round of funding in 
Cambricon, a startup focusing on the development of specialized machine 
learning hardware150.
National policies depend critically on what can be practically 
controlled by a state.151 In a competitive environment, nations seek to 
control levers to shape the prospects of their adversaries, or at least the 
means of denying them access to key opportunities. Norms of open 
publication in research, the existence of widely distributed open-source 
toolkits, and the ever widening circle of those familiar with the practice of 
machine learning suggest that efforts to control research, software, or 
specialists in general will be challenging over time.152 Computational 
power, with its small number of actors and large, fixed production facilities, 
is likely to be a focal point for national competition in the space. 
International rivalry around the technology of machine learning will 
therefore in large part manifest itself in practice as international rivalry over 
the supply chain of computational power. 
This is particularly true in the US-China context, where US 
companies depend on the manufacturing capability of a Chinese neighbor - 
Taiwan - and China desires access to more advanced computing power to 
support machine learning applications. Through market leaders Nvidia and 
Xilinx, Taiwanese foundries TSMC and UMC play a critical role in the 
manufacture of high-end GPUs and the FPGAs likely to support machine 
learning applications going forwards. 
As CFIUS seems poised to make it increasingly challenging for China 
to pursue acquisitions of US semiconductor companies, shaping Taiwanese 
trade and foreign investment policies in semiconductors will assume greater 
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importance.153 The extent to which the US is able to successfully deny 
China access to advanced computing power, and the extent to which China 
is able to develop it domestically or acquire it otherwise, remains to be seen. 
The outcome will play a major role in determining the availability and 
sophistication of machine learning systems in different markets and among 
companies globally.
These trends may be further exacerbated as the machine learning field 
itself continues to evolve. In particular, there exist a rapidly developing set 
of research areas within machine learning - simulation learning, self-play, 
and meta-learning - which seem poised to heighten the importance of 
computational power as the key element in advancing the effectiveness of 
machine learning models. Moreover, meta-learning, which seeks to 
automate the architecture of machine learning algorithms, may also enable 
computational power to substitute somewhat for a lack of ready research 
and engineering specialists in the space.
 
PART IV: COMPUTATIONAL POWER AS DATA SUBSTITUTE
Computational power is just one ingredient in the process of training 
effective machine learning systems. Machine learning also requires 
sufficient and appropriate data, the examples on which the system will learn 
a good representation of the task it is attempting to accomplish. 
The cost and availability of these inputs is crucial in thinking about 
the distributional impact of machine learning. Depending on the resources 
available to the practitioner and the presence of pre-existing data, acquiring 
both of these critical inputs may be more or less feasible for solving a 
particular problem. This influences both the set of actors that can generate 
novel machine learning systems, as well as the set of domains that machine 
learning can be effectively used in. 
While computational power is increasingly commoditized and 
available as a service, acquiring and cleaning data appropriate to training a 
system to solve a given task remains stubbornly costly and time-consuming 
in a number of domains. Insofar as commercial actors continue to be the 
153 See supra note 113, Patterson (Quoting one industry analyst that “China will find it very 
tough to buy U.S. high-tech companies and difficult to leverage Chinese joint ventures or 
wholly-owned enterprises to access key U.S. intellectual property…We thus expect more 
senior Taiwan veterans to join China’s semiconductor industry as a second wave of talent 
moves to China.”)
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primary investors in the development of machine learning, this may render 
a set of potential machine learning applications infeasible or unprofitable to 
invest in developing. 
However, one significant recent trend on this front has been a set of 
research successes which - in certain domains - are reducing a dependence 
on acquiring real-world data and increasing the role of computational power 
in the training of machine learning systems. This is significant since in these 
situations leveraging machine learning will be limited by the cost and 
availability of computing power, rather than the more fixed costs of 
gathering data in a specific domain. There are three arenas of research 
which seem particularly promising in this respect: simulation learning, self-
play, and meta-learning. 
Simulation Learning
Simulation learning seeks to replace the need for collecting real-world 
data by training an agent in a virtual space. For example, rather than 
training a robot arm to grasp objects by having a real robot arm attempting 
to pick up many different types of objects in the physical world, this 
approach trains the machine by having it “experience” picking up virtual 
objects in a computer simulation.154 Once the system learns a good 
representation of the task, it can then be implemented to control a robot arm 
in the real world.155 Successes in using this approach have prompted a 
number of different simulation environments for training agents to be 
released in recent years.156
The continuing advancement of simulation learning changes the 
balance of data and computational power. From a practical perspective, 
154 Compare Xue Bin Peng et al, Generalizing from Simulation, OpenAI Blog (2017), 
https://blog.openai.com/generalizing-from-simulation/ (last visited Mar 21, 2018) with 
Sergey Levine, Deep Learning for Robots: Learning from Large-Scale Interaction, Google 
Research Blog, https://research.googleblog.com/2016/03/deep-learning-for-robots-
learning-from.html (last visited Mar 21, 2018).
155 See, e.g., Xue Bin Peng et al., Sim-to-Real Transfer of Robotic Control with Dynamics 
Randomization, (2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.06537 (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Josh 
Tobin et al., Domain Randomization for Transferring Deep Neural Networks from 
Simulation to the Real World, arXiv:1703.06907 [cs] (2017), 
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156 See Microsoft shares open source system for training drones, other gadgets to move 
safely on their own, Microsoft AI Blog (2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/ai/microsoft-
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effective simulation learning removes the costs and logistical challenges of 
collecting data through sensors in the real world. In effect, it substitutes 
computational power for data as an input in machine learning. This is 
particularly promising since simulation learning might enable the collection 
of data far beyond what would be practical in the real world. Taking the 
example discussed above, a simulated approach may be able to run many 
more trials with virtual arms and virtual objects than the constraints of 
warehousing, maintenance, and energy in a real-world setting would allow. 
This at least theoretically holds out the promise of creating more effective 
machine learning systems which are trained on a more substantial simulated 
dataset at a faster rate. 
These gains may be limited to particular types of domains. One 
obvious limitation of this approach is that it will only be effective in 
situations in which the simulation acts as a sufficiently realistic proxy for 
the actual challenge. A simulation which has unrealistic assumptions will 
cause the agent to learn a poor representation that fails when it is finally 
deployed “in the field.”157 Simulating a robot operating in the physical 
world, for instance, may be relatively more straightforward than simulating 
group social behavior or ecological systems where underlying forces are not 
well understood. 
Self-Play
Simulation learning avoids the need for collecting real-world data by 
substituting a virtual environment for an agent to interact with. Self-play 
avoids the need for real-world data by having an agent play itself in order to 
improve and acquire “experience” in a given task. It therefore represents 
another method which effectively substitutes computational power for data 
as an input in the machine learning process. 
At the time of writing, one notable demonstration of the use of self-
play as a technique for reducing a dependence on data has been AlphaZero, 
a system designed by Google’s DeepMind research lab which was able to 
achieve champion level skill at the board games of Go, chess, and shogi 
without the use of any pre-existing data of human games.158 This marks a 
departure from earlier versions of these systems, which required training on 
data around historical examples of Go games to achieve a certain level of 
157 See supra note 148 at 1.
158 David Silver et al., Mastering Chess and Shogi by Self-Play with a General 
Reinforcement Learning Algorithm, arXiv:1712.01815 [cs] (2017), 
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proficiency.159 These self-play methods have also enabled advancements in 
transfer learning, allowing agents which learn skills in one environment to 
apply it in a new, novel one.160
Like simulation learning, self-play is also somewhat domain limited 
to situations in which the competitive action of two agents will generate the 
data necessary to train the system to solve the desired problem. But, in these 
contexts, computational power becomes a primary rate limiter of progress, 
rather than the availability of data. As in the simulation learning case, 
sufficient computational power enables a multitude of agents to rapidly play 
a number of games which potentially outstrips the data that is available 
from games played by humans. 
Meta-Learning
Learning architectures - the system by which a machine learning 
system extracts features and acquires a good representation of the task it is 
intended to solve - are another key ingredient in the machine learning 
workflow. For the purposes of this discussion, these architectures are 
notable since they influence the efficiency of the training process, defining 
how successful a trained machine learning system will be at a task for a 
given amount of training examples given to it. 
These learning architectures have traditionally been hand-crafted by 
researchers and engineers developing these systems. Meta-learning seeks to 
automate this work by treating the task of designing these architectures as 
itself a machine learning task.161 This approach has seen a number of 
promising successes, with machine generated learning architectures 
outpacing the benchmarked performance of their human crafted 
counterparts at the same task.162 Meta-learning has also been used to 
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optimize the distributions of neural networks across CPUs and GPUs and 
improve training and inference performance.163
Advancements in these techniques again have implications for the role 
of computational power in the workflow of machine learning. For one, 
meta-learning might improve the performance of machine learning systems 
with a given dataset, or enable equivalent performance with less data. 
Secondly, the automation of learning architecture design may also increase 
the speed at which new machine learning systems can be designed by aiding 
human technicians in creating the appropriate architecture for a given task. 
Meta-learning does not offer a direct substitute to real-world data in 
the same way that simulation learning and self-play seem to. But, meta-
learning is parallel to these methods insofar as it potentially reduces the 
amount of data needed to train a system to successfully accomplish a task. 
Meta-learning also accentuates the need for computational power, as a 
training process is required for generating an effective learning architecture 
as well as in learning how to accomplish the task itself. 
Impact: Computational Power and Economic Impact
These shifts in the research field have broader significance because of 
the role that the inputs of machine learning play in defining its economic 
impact. Machine learning must be cost-effective and equivalently proficient 
at accomplishing a given task before it can serve as a competitive substitute 
for a human executing the same task. However, achieving this level of 
proficiency requires a machine learning model to be trained - a process that 
typically requires both sufficient computational power and sufficient data. 
The availability of data and the cost of acquiring will vary depending 
on the domain. Existing market forces may already make this data freely 
available and structured for use. However, there are numerous reasons why 
this may not be the case. Legal restrictions rooted in copyright or privacy 
may make it expensive or challenging to acquire data.164 The specific 
domain may itself make the practical tasks around acquiring the right data 
difficult. This is important because the poor availability of data can make it 
163 Azalia Mirhoseini et al., Device Placement Optimization with Reinforcement Learning, 
arXiv:1706.04972 [cs] (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.04972 (last visited Feb 13, 2018).
164 See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s 
Implicit Bias Problem (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3024938 (last visited Mar 
21, 2018).
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challenging for machine learning to produce a system which is an effective 
automated substitute for a given task. In the very least, these barriers may 
make the application of machine learning economically unviable for certain 
tasks and domains.
The advancements in machine learning research discussed above are 
significant because they reduce the dependence on data collection as a 
necessary component for training a machine learning system effectively. 
Simulation learning and self-play substitute computational power for data, 
enabling a system to learn a skill effectively without the physical costs and 
logistical requirements of real world collection. Meta-learning potentially 
boosts the efficiency of models by adding more computational power. 
These shifts have two economic impacts, one on the issue of technological 
unemployment, and the other on the issue of the industrial organization of 
machine learning. 
Technological Unemployment
The economic literature examining the issue of technological 
unemployment in the context of machine learning has often abstracted away 
from the influence that inputs of data and compute have on the success of 
machine learning systems.165 One method is to rely on surveys of expert 
opinion about the likelihood that a given task is broadly subject to 
automation by machines.166 Common sources for these skills include the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and its successor O*NET - 
databases compiled by the US Department of Labor.167 These skills are 
usually articulated in a broad way, such as “[t]he ability to see objects in the 
presence of glare or bright lighting” or “[t]he ability to communicate 
information and ideas in speaking so others will understand.”168
165 See, e.g., Anton Korinek and Joseph E Stiglitz, Artificial Intelligence, Worker-
Replacing Technological Change and Income Distribution, NBER Economics of Artificial 
Intelligence 2017, http://www.nber.org/conf_papers/f100963/f100963.pdf; David Autor & 
Anna Salomons, Robocalypse Now–Does Productivity Growth Threaten Employment?, 
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166 See, e.g., Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The future of employment: How 
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Change 254–280 (2017).
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However, examining whether or not machine learning would enable 
the automation of “the handling of irregular objects” in such an abstract 
way may fail to take into account the costs and practicality of assembling 
the data necessary to train a system to an adequate level of proficiency in a 
domain. It may also mask challenges in training a system to be sufficiently 
robust to accomplish this task across a broad set of sectors and contexts. 
The data needed to train a machine learning model to grasp an irregular 
object in a well-lit, controlled environment may differ considerably from 
the training data needed to teach it to do so underwater, or in the dark. 
Examining the availability and cost of these data inputs therefore becomes 
critical since it can determine the practical terms under which a human skill 
is subject to automation. 
The influence of data availability on machine learning performance 
suggests that the impact of machine learning on labor automation will 
proceed in a fragmentary, domain specific way. The data-replacing (or data-
minimizing) techniques discussed above seem poised to accentuate this 
differential development. Though impressive, simulation learning and self-
play are not all-purpose; they are most appropriate as learning schemes in 
specific circumstances. Self-play is specific to a reinforcement learning 
context with competing agents, and simulation learning is most effective in 
situations where it is feasible to construct a virtual space analogous to the 
real-world problem being solved. However, within these applicable 
domains, the barrier to machine learning being applied to a situation may be 
fixed by the cost of computing power, rather than the unpredictable costs 
and occasionally absolute barriers to collecting data on a particular task. 
That may accelerate displacement in those domains.
There are a scattered constellation of applicable domains suggested by 
these two techniques. Applications in robotics - in which an agent needs to 
accomplish a physical task in the real world, may be particularly benefitted 
by the acceleration made possible by simulation learning.169 Competitive 
marketplaces, from capital markets to programmatic advertising, may be 
places where techniques such as self-play work to significantly improve 
machine learning system performance. Military autonomy may also be 
similarly impacted as self-play and simulation learning together allow the 
training of drones and other robotics in a manner it would otherwise be 
169 See, e.g., Cade Metz, A.I. Researchers Leave Elon Musk Lab to Begin Robotics Start-
Up, The New York Times, November 6, 2017, 
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visited Mar 22, 2018).
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prohibitively expensive to do in the real-world. Within these types of 
contexts, machine learning may begin to have a disproportionate impact. 
Meta-learning impacts the relationship between machine learning, 
automation, and labor in a related, but more general way. Meta-learning 
may produce an overall improvement in the ability for systems to be trained 
to an adequate level of proficiency on a task with less data. This may make 
certain applications at the margin more viable than they would otherwise 
be, particularly in situations where data is scarce. These techniques may 
also lower the costs to creating new machine learning systems where 
engineering and development costs would have previously made investment 
in developing a capability unprofitable. Certain domains may have plentiful 
data, but the costs of developing and tuning an appropriate learning 
architecture and the potential profit of offering a product in that domain 
may render the choice to actually invest in developing the product 
unattractive. By aiding human domain experts in architecting these systems, 
meta-learning impacts the engineering time and cost of developing new 
systems and in doing so broadens the set of arenas that machine learning 
will be deployed in. 
It is important to recognize that the processes by which labor is 
automated are complex, and not purely economic and technical. The ability 
for machine learning to proficiently accomplish a task is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for that task to be actually automated in practice. 
Business practices can take a long time to respond to technological 
change.170 Work is a sociotechnical system - and many forces shape who is 
employed and how work is accomplished. Automation may depend less on 
the economic opportunities presented by the technology, and more on a 
complex fabric of local historical and cultural factors171. Nevertheless, these 
techniques may open opportunities to automate where it was previously 
technically infeasible or cost-prohibitive to do so. 
170 James Manyika et al, A Future That Works: Automation, Employment, and 
Productivity, McKinsey Global Institute 70 (2017), available at 
https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/2017-in-review/automation-and-the-future-of-
work/a-future-that-works-automation-employment-and-productivity (concluding that 
“automation will be a global force, but adoption will take decades and there is significant 
uncertainty on timing”).
171 See, e.g., Alex Rosenblat and Tim Hwang, Regional Diversity in Autonomy and Work: 
A Case Study from Uber and Lyft Drivers (2016), available at 
https://datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Rosenblat-Hwang_Regional_Diversity-10-13.pdf 
(highlighting regional variation in machine learning driven workplaces); Marc Levinson, 
The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger, Chapters 5-6 (2008) (discussing local political circumstances shaping industrial 
outcomes in shipping automation).
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Industrial Organization
We can look at the economic impact of these research developments 
in two ways. Simulation learning, self-play, and meta-learning enable 
computational power to play a bigger role not just in defining the impact of 
machine learning on labor generally, but also in the competitive landscape 
between various firms seeking to offer products and services driven by AI, 
as well. To this end, computational power will play a role in shaping the 
industrial organization of machine learning: the types of competition, its 
level of consolidation, and the opportunities for new entrants. 
Two “ingredients” serve as barriers to entry in machine learning: the 
data necessary to train the systems, and the relatively small pool of qualified 
talent necessary to build effective learning architectures.172 Possessors of 
these assets have been able to generate some of the most impressive and 
groundbreaking machine learning systems, while competitors lacking these 
assets have been unable to compete on similar footing.173
These data-substituting and data-minimizing techniques are important 
because they shift the competitive balances between companies looking to 
lead in the latest generation of AI. For one, the advantages of data 
incumbency may be significantly eroded in certain markets. Expansive 
historical datasets on farm machinery to train agricultural robots, for 
instance, may be offset by sufficient computational power to simply 
simulate this farm machinery in a virtual space. As the research continues to 
develop, these may represent two viable paths towards developing and 
offering effective machine learning products in the space.
The benefits of these research developments might then redound to 
the handful of large technology companies that have been already investing 
most aggressively in the latest generation of machine learning such as 
Google and Facebook. These are companies which already possess 
significant endowments of computational power. On that count, the 
improvement of simulation learning or self-play may enable these existing 
technology leaders to enter new industries and provide products to meet use 
172 See, e.g., Cade Metz, Tech Giants Are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, The 
New York Times, October 22, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-experts-
salaries.html (last visited Mar 21, 2018).
173 See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Apple’s Privacy Pledge Complicates Its Push Into Artificial 
Intelligence, WIRED, Jul 14, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/apple-ai-privacy/ (last 
visited Mar 21, 2018).
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cases even where they lack training data. In the very least, it provides 
greater leverage to these technology companies in partnership negotiations 
with existing companies within a sector that do possess real world data.
Meta-learning is likely to have a similar impact in practice, though in 
theory it should act as a leveler in the space. Meta-learning enables 
computational power to offset the advantages that a competitor may have in 
human machine learning expertise and talent. As the research matures and 
the techniques become increasingly commoditized, the autonomous 
construction of learning architectures may allow industries with extensive 
data and access to computing power to develop their own machine learning 
driven products effectively. 
But, it is unclear at what rate meta-learning will become more 
commodified and usable by non-specialists. Though it seems poised to 
accelerate development times and improve the performance of learning 
architectures, meta-learning itself at the moment continues to require 
technical expertise and computational power to leverage effectively. 
Established technology companies may very well stand to gain again from 
these research developments, given their existing endowments of compute 
and expertise. In this view, meta-learning will tend to act as a force 
multiplier for entities which already have machine learning talent on hand, 
rather than democratizing the technology to entities with no experts at all.  
These trends tend to suggest greater consolidation in the marketplace 
of companies offering products and services driven by machine learning. 
Simulation learning, self-play, and meta-learning all chip away at the 
potential advantage that non-AI focused industries might have in competing 
to offer their own machine learning systems: their data. In the very least, 
these trends suggest that one likely outcome is an ecosystem in which other 
industries rely on a handful of leading technology companies who provide 
these technologies as an “as a service” platform. This already seems to be in 
progress, as Google, Amazon, and a number of other companies compete to 
offer machine learning capabilities as a series of commodified APIs.174
CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR GOVERNANCE
174 See, e.g., Google, Google Cloud: Machine Learning at Scale, 
https://cloud.google.com/products/machine-learning/; Amazon, Machine Learning on 
AWS, https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/.
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Computational power does more than simply enable the current 
generation of breakthroughs in machine learning. Trends in computational 
architecture, semiconductor supply chains, and the field of machine learning 
itself suggest the multifaceted ways in which hardware plays a role in 
influencing the immediate and long-term impact of the technology on 
society. 
These changes in the underlying hardware layer would appear to 
accentuate many existing concerns that have been raised around AI. 
Progression towards more specialized hardware seems to expand the 
privacy concerns presented by the technology, and present challenges to the 
nimble repair of these systems in the field. Evolving competition in the 
semiconductor industry seems likely to make machine learning a flashpoint 
in the broader economic conflicts between the US and China. 
Breakthroughs in simulation learning, self-play, and meta-learning seem 
likely to expand incumbent market power and potentially accelerate labor 
displacement. 
Simultaneously, seeing these issues through the lens of hardware also 
raises opportunities for governance. Computational power is intimately 
linked to a nexus of issues in civil rights, consumer safety, geopolitical 
competition, labor policy, and corporate power. In contrast to the software 
and data that the practice of machine learning relies on, hardware and its 
production is more centralized, more able to be monitored, and less able to 
evade efforts to govern it. Hardware therefore offers one tangible point of 
control for those seeking to find levers on which to base policy and 
effectively shape the social impact of the technology. 
Public policy to shape the markets and design of machine learning 
hardware might manifest in a range of different ways. Existing tools in the 
form of export controls and trade policy will play a significant role, 
especially given the specific political geography of the actors leading the 
design and actual fabrication of these chips. Industrial policy which aims to 
accelerate the development of a domestic semiconductor sector like 
SEMATECH, or otherwise ensure reliable access to computational power 
by companies and government actors working at the software layer of 
machine learning, will also play an important role. As FPGAs and ASICs 
broaden the potential range of contexts in which machine learning inference 
might be deployed, new regulations and industry standards might also serve 
to enshrine particular architectures for delivering machine learning products 
and services.
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It is important to recognize that the current affordance that 
computational power provides to those thinking about the governance of AI 
may not be permanent. The machine learning field continues to evolve at a 
rapid rate, and new discoveries may change the relative importance and 
economics of computational power going forwards. Rapid advances in 
“one-shot learning”, which aim to enable machines to train effectively on 
smaller numbers of examples; or “transfer learning”, which works to allow 
machines to effectively use knowledge from one domain in another, may 
reduce the need for computational power. Indeed, a dependence on machine 
learning hardware and concerns about reliable access to it may itself 
motivate increased investment and more rapid progress on solving these 
types of technical problems.
As with simulation learning and self-play, it is possible that these 
research areas may have a narrower influence, influencing only specific 
domains and settings in which machine learning is deployed. Much of what 
we currently understand about machine learning suggests that significant 
computational power will continue to be a key component in building 
effective systems.175 Regardless, any policy developed around such a fast-
moving technology must take a potential future rewrite of our existing 
assumptions into account. 
Multiple efforts have been launched to construct a global structure of 
governance around the research, development, and application of AI.176 
Many of these efforts are developing standards or sets of principles to guide 
the actions of the technology industry and the broader community of 
researchers and engineers working on machine learning.177 The aim has 
175 This is particularly the case given the increased performance that more data seems to 
promise. See Chen Sun et al., Revisiting Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data in Deep 
Learning Era, arXiv:1707.02968 [cs] (2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1707.02968 (last visited 
Mar 21, 2018).
176 See, e.g., The Partnership on AI, http://partnershiponai.org/; The IEEE Global Initiative 
on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligence Systems, https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org/; 
Building Agile Governance for AI & Robotics (BGI4AI), https://bgi4ai.org/
177 See, e.g., Partnership on AI, Tenets, https://www.partnershiponai.org/tenets/; IEEE, 
7000 - Model Process for Addressing Ethical Concerns During System Design, 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/project/7000.html; Future of Life, Asilomar AI Principles, 
https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/; The Conference Towards AI Network Society, 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000507517.pdf; DJ Patil, A Code of Ethics for Data 
Science (2018), https://medium.com/@dpatil/a-code-of-ethics-for-data-science-
cda27d1fac1 (last visited Mar 22, 2018). For further sets of principles, see, e.g., Accenture, 
An Ethical Framework for Responsible AI and Robots, https://www.accenture.com/gb-
en/company-responsible-ai-robotics; The Future Computed: Artificial Intelligence and its 
role in society, The Official Microsoft Blog (2018), 
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been to attempt to shape norms around how the technology is applied, and 
the ethical responsibilities around the use of data as an input in the training 
process. This is one approach, one which is likely to become increasingly 
difficult to enforce effectively as the set of actors that might use the 
technology for good or for ill, responsibly or irresponsibly, continues to 
expand. As this transition occurs, governance efforts focused on shaping the 
direction and availability of computational power may offer a useful 
addition to the toolkit of policy options, and an increasingly important one 
at that. 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2018/01/17/future-computed-artificial-intelligence-role-
society/ (last visited Mar 21, 2018); Larry Dignan, IBM’s Rometty lays out AI 
considerations, ethical principles ZDNet, http://www.zdnet.com/article/ibms-rometty-lays-
out-ai-considerations-ethical-principles/ (last visited Mar 21, 2018).
